So some wayward thoughts on philosophy of mind, though that is perhaps a high-falutin' way of putting it. In ed class we've been told about concept-images, the characteristic tokens of concepts, where concepts are to be understood, I think, as types, so that we have these are mental tokens of mental types, I think, though the presenters have not made this very clear. I am of course skeptical, as no presenter has made it clear why this distinction is important, why it may lead to error, though of course I can think of a few reasons why having a concept-image of a car only with its wheels on the ground might be misleading, the old Wittgensteinian problems with ostentive definition, ('he will suppose that "two" is the name given to this group of nuts!', Section 28 (heheh) --Which nuts?--These nuts.). Of course, my concept-image of a car is not made bit by bit by un-unionized victims of globalization, so maybe I'm completely off base here. It's just not clear how we can go by behavior to make conclusions about these concept-images, it'll all depend on the cues ("Draw a rectangle" versus "Picture a rectangle in your head. [ouch! At least it's not pointy!] Now, draw it [meaning a representation of it]"). But this is just needless skepticism, as of course we should look at the point, the use, of such a distinction, which surely must exist. Just not in my head.

I say this because of course I don't think the way I write or speak, or in any particular language. It's mostly colors (earth tones these days) and furrowings. I, for instance, do not think thoughts like, "Andro-het bujii-imperialism permeates homosex hierarchies." No, complaining about whitey keeping me from getting laid is what bloggin and talkin're for.